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Few issue areas exemplify the centrifugal forces that prompted the emergence of global law 
scholarship better than the environment. With its propensity to blur or transcend conventional 
distinctions between national and international, public and private, and formal and informal, 
environmental governance offers a consummate case study to test the promise and perils of global 
law. In this article, we situate global environmental law in the broader debate about lawmaking and 
application beyond the nation state, tracing the evolution and elusive boundaries of this nascent 
field. Our survey allows us to identify conceptual ambiguities and missed opportunities in the 
literature on global environmental law, including challenges to its normativity and legitimacy. From 
there, however, we proceed to outline a twofold opportunity for the global environmental law 
project: an opportunity to enrich environmental law with more diverse and inclusive practices; and 
an opportunity for collaborative self-reflexivity by the scholars and practitioners of environmental 
law as these not only interpret and apply, but through their work actively shape the content of the 
law. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article has been inspired by discussions on global environmental law between different 
scholars approaching the topic from different perspectives, with different degrees of scepticism and 
enthusiasm. The starting point of these discussions was our curiosity to better understand what 
global environmental law is, why this scholarship has emerged, and how it relates to the ongoing 
rich discussions on global law, as well as on law and globalization more generally. A second 
motivation for this article has been our desire to better understand and articulate our concerns with 
respect to global (environmental) law, that is, with respect to what we see as a transformative 
agenda and a project that seeks to change in fundamental ways how we understand law, lawmaking, 
the validity of legal sources, and the nature of legitimacy. We acknowledge and emphasize the need 
to engage with these issues in greater depth than past global environmental law scholarship has 
done. At the same time, we are optimistic about the transformative potential of global 
environmental law, and the opportunities it provides to better integrate into our academic thinking 
the varied changes we are witnessing across the landscape of international environmental law, all 
the while ensuring that the numerous affected actors and their voices and concerns are better 
reflected in the processes related to the formulation, expansion, and implementation of global 
environmental law. Our third motivation has therefore been the desire to explore and identify 
further opportunities for ourselves and other scholars to engage with the global environmental law 
research and teaching agendas, and identify openings to feed these insights into the ongoing broader 
discussions on global and transnational law. 
 
The structure of the article reflects these three aspirations, and our divergent starting points with 
respect to global (environmental) law are undoubtedly reflected in the contents. The article begins 
by situating global environmental law scholarship in the broader landscape of global law and 
transnational law scholarship. It argues that international environmental lawyers have thus far not 
fully exploited the opportunities to engage with these broader debates. The article then turns 
towards examining the several important challenges that arise from the idea of global 
(environmental) law and the transformative agenda it inevitably entails. It argues that, while global 
(environmental) law scholars have not put forward a strong and explicit argument supporting the 
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idea of global environmental law as a body of norms that would apply universally across legal 
systems and jurisdictions regardless of their formal pedigree, global environmental law scholarship 
nevertheless reaches beyond merely observing and recording empirical transformations in the legal 
landscape. On the contrary, we see global (environmental) law as a consciously transformative 
agenda that is partly driven by academic activism towards a paradigm change that ultimately 
challenges received notions of the meaning of law, lawmaking, legitimacy, and the validity of legal 
sources. Still, we also observe an urgent need to better integrate the study of such jurisgenerative 
and normative categories into global environmental law scholarship, as well as an opportunity to 
brandish the transformative potential of global law against a perennial challenge of traditional 
lawmaking beyond the domestic realm: its persistent legitimacy gap, which expanded participation 
in a process of inclusive deliberation – allowed by the more fluid demarcation lines of global law – 
could at long last help alleviate. The final section of this article will turn to opportunities for 
international environmental lawyers to contribute to the global law debate. Here, the article 
identifies the need to take a collaborative approach in that endeavour with a view to building 
connections with debates on global justice. 
 
2.  GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP IN CONTEXT 
What has driven the emergence of global environmental law scholarship? Looking from a broader 
perspective, this growing body of literature forms part of a much larger ongoing debate in law and 
other fields of social science.1 Within legal scholarship, this debate can be situated under the broad 
umbrella of scholarship addressing law and globalization;2 in other words, it forms part of efforts to 
rethink and reorganize the legal worldview to reflect and capture the many changes and upheavals 
scholars and practitioners are witnessing on the ground due to the forces of globalization.  
 
A common definition of globalization highlights increasing interconnectedness between societies in 
terms of political, economic, social and cultural events. Political, social and economic activities are 
stretching across borders, regions and continents.3 Global networks and flows of trade, investment, 
finance, culture and so on are growing in magnitude. 4  Global interactions and processes are 
speeding up as the development of worldwide transport and communication systems accelerates the 
                                                 
1 These developments have been described by several scholars, including D. Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global 
Governance’, in J.L. Dunoff & J.P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World: Constiutionalism, International Law and 
Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 37-68, at 38. 
2 J. Husa, Law and Globalisation (Edward Elgar, 2018). 
3 D. Held & P. Maffettone, ‘Introduction: Globalization, Global Politics and the Cosmopolitan Palteau’, in: D. Held & 
P. Maffettone (eds), Global Political Theory (Polity Press, 2016), pp. 14-33, at 14-5. 
4 Ibid. 
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diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people.5 Global interactions and processes are 
also deepening in the sense that local events can come to have sweeping global consequences.6 
Globalization remains, however, a highly complex, contested and multidimensional phenomenon. 
Thus, fundamental questions have been raised in the literature on, inter alia, how ‘new’ 
globalization is, whether it is a positive or negative development, how it will affect the respective 
roles of states and democracy, and other related matters.  
 
In the legal sphere, globalization has been defined as consisting ‘of processes by which different 
organized large-scale normativities become increasingly interconnected and interdependent, 
crossing the traditional borders of nation states, intergovernmental organisations, and non-
governmental organisations’.7 Forces driving legal globalization include economic globalization 
that increases incentives towards regulatory harmonization and the creation of transnational 
institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).8 More 
closely related to the focus of this article, the ascent of global environmental risks, such as climate 
change, ozone depletion and biodiversity loss, is also playing a role in the globalization of law.9 
 
Together, the forces of globalization are seen as weakening the ‘great divide’ between international 
and national law.10 The traditional and still very much prevailing vision of the legal world dates 
back to the creation of the Westphalian system in the 17th century, dominated by the concept of 
sovereign states and the dichotomy of national and international law. While this image includes 
transnational legal activity in the sense of public and private international law crossing state 
boundaries, both these concepts remain highly state-centric11  as their focus is on relationships 
among sovereign states and national legal orders respectively.12 This traditional vision of the legal 
world has been fittingly labelled as the black box model.13  However, with globalization, neat 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Husa, n. 2 above, p. 5. 
8 V. Heyvaert, Transnational Environmental Regulation and Governance: Purpose, Strategies and Principles 
(Cambridge University Press, 2018), at pp. 6-7. 
9 Ibid., p. 7. 
10 N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
at pp. 14-5. 
11 G.C. Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change’, in: G.C. Shaffer (ed.), Transnational Legal Ordering 
and State Change (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1-22, at 3. 
12 K. Tuori, ‘Transnational Law: On Legal Hybrids and Legal Perspectivism’, in: M. Maduro, K. Tuori & S. Sankari 
(eds), Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 11-
57, at 11-2. 
13 Ibid., pp. 12-3. Tuori refers to W. Twinning, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Northwestern University Press, 2000). 
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organizations of the legal universe have come to face multiple challenges.14 Sovereign states remain 
crucial, but their role is rapidly changing. Different actors of globalization, such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), law firms, financial markets and multinational corporations 
are taking part in the creation of new kinds of normativities, and new border-crossing realities are 
evolving and transforming. 15  As Husa indicates, ‘the need for a non-nation-state-bound 
understanding of overlapping legal sources is growing and the necessity of knowledge of how to 
deal with polycentrism and pluralism of laws has grown intensely’. 16  However, the ongoing 
scholarly debates are far from conclusive: there is no consensus on how much globalization has 
influenced law or whether this influence has been beneficial or detrimental.17  
 
In legal scholarship, different theories and approaches are therefore under construction seeking to 
accommodate law that does not fit into the traditional categories of national law and international 
law. The key ones include global legal pluralism, 18  transnational law 19  and global law. 20 
Scholarship on global legal pluralism builds on anthropological research on colonial and neo-
colonial law, and historical work on medieval law,21 to better understand the role of multiple non-
state actors in influencing the development of law at different levels and sites,22 including on the 
basis of values and knowledge systems that have been historically left at the margins of negotiations 
or public/private-driven action.23 One of the focus areas is the interplay of international law and the 
customary law of indigenous peoples.24  
                                                 
14 T.C. Halliday & G.C. Shaffer (eds), Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015); M. Maduro, K. 
Tuori & S. Sankari (eds), Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014); C. Scott, ‘“Transnational Law” as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions’ (2009) 10(7) German Law Journal, 
pp. 859-76; G.C. Shaffer, ‘Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering’ (2016) 12 Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, pp. 231-53; P. Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Law’, in J. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2006), pp. 738-54. 
15 Husa, n. 2 above, p. 6. 
16 Ibid., p. 8. 
17 Ibid., p. 4. 
18 G. Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’, in G. Teubner (ed.) Global 
Law without a State, (Aldershot, 1997), pp. 3–28; P.S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law 
Beyond Borders (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Krisch, n. 10 above. 
19 P. Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956). On recent scholarship, see Halliday & Shaffer, n. 14 
above; Maduro, Tuori & Sankari, (eds n. 11 above. 
20 N. Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015); see also G.Z. Capaldo, The Pillars of 
Global Law (Ashgate, 2008); R. Domingo, The New Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010); S. Musa & E. de 
Volder (eds), Reflections on Global Law (Brill, 2013). 
21 T.C. Halliday & G. Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’, in Halliday & Shaffer, n. 14 above, pp. 3-72, at 26. 
22 N. Affolder, ‘Non-State Actors’, in E. Morgera & J. Razzaque (eds), Encyclopedia of Environmental Law: 
Biodiversity and Nature Protection Law (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 387-398, at 387. 
23 L. Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies (Zed Books, 2012); J. Hendry, M.L. Tatum, M. Jorgensen & D. 
Howard-Wagner (eds), Indigenous Justice: New Tools, Approaches and Spaces (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). For 
examples see: Forest Peoples Programme, International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity and the Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Local Biodiversity Outlooks: Indigenous Peoples’ and Local Communities’ 
Contributions to the Implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, A complement for the fourth 
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The concept ‘transnational law’ was coined by Jessup in the 1950s, at a time when hope in public 
international law and public international institutions had withered as a result of the Cold War.25 
Jessup was particularly interested in the ability of private international law to resolve transnational 
problems through its decentralized system of allocating jurisdictional ‘power’ among national 
courts, which then used choice of law techniques to decide the applicable law.26 The relationship 
between private and public international law has continued to attract scholarly attention until today, 
including with regard to the delimitation (and potentially strategic use of) of states’ regulatory 
authority and (barriers to) the protection of fundamental rights.27 While a wealth of literature on 
transnational law has subsequently emerged – including more than 50 journals with the words 
transnational law/transnational legal in their title28 - the notion is often used ‘without adequate 
conceptual work on what the term covers.’29 A broad conception of transnational law, also reflected 
in Jessup’s work, includes both public and private international law, as well as law governing 
transnational activities not traditionally included within them. 30  A narrow conception sees 
transnational law as composed only of norms that cross national borders and do not fit the 
traditional categories of public and private international law.31 Teubner’s work, for example, has 
drawn inspiration from a scholarly debate on lex mercatoria and the highly controversial arguments 
that ‘merely “private” orders (contracts and associations) produce valid law without authorization 
from and control by the state’ and that ‘lex mercatoria is valid outside the nation state and even 
outside international relations’.32 According to Teubner, such views have broken some taboos about 
the necessary connections between law and the state.33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
edition of the Global Biodiversity outlook (2016); Indigenous Circle of Experts (ICE), We rise together: Achieving 
Pathway to Canada Target 1 through the creation of Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas in the spirit and 
practice of reconciliation (2018). 
24 E.g., generally G.A. Sarfaty, ‘International Norm Diffusion in the Pimicikamak Cree Nation: A Model of Legal 
Mediation’ (2007) 48(2) Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 441-82 
25 G.C. Shaffer & C. Coye, ‘From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law. From International Law to 
Transnational Legal Ordering’, School of Law University of California  Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2017-
02, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2895159, p. 1. 
26 Ibid.  
27 E.g., A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009); D. 
French et al. (eds), Linkages and Boundaries in Private and Public International Law (Hart, 2018). 
28 Shaffer, ‘Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering,’ n. 14 above. 
29 Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change,’ n. 11 above, p. 4. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Teubner, n. 18 above, p. 7; as other scholars have observed, of course, such private arrangements – unlike state-based 
law – are not generally able to create legal obligations for third parties, see e.g. O. Dilling & T. Markus, ‘The 
Transnationalisation of Environmental Law’, (2018) 30 Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 179-206. 
33 Teubner, n. 18 above, p. 7. 
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Also the discussion on global law is characterized by fluid conceptual boundaries. Shaffer, for 
instance, has argued that transnational law and global law are partly overlapping notions, in the 
sense that under each, ‘law is being denationalized, to varying degrees’ because the legal norms 
may not be part of international and national law conventionally construed.34 Halliday and Shaffer 
have in fact argued that the ‘terminology of “global” law misleading because much legal ordering 
today is not global in its geographic reach, but it nonetheless involves variation in legal ordering 
beyond the nation state’.35 In their view, the concepts of transnational legal orders and transnational 
legal ordering best capture this reality as ‘the geographic, substantive, and organizational scope of 
such legal ordering varies, and because it involves both public and private actors’.36  
 
In turn, Walker pointed out that ‘there has been little serious discussion – and little agreement 
where there has been discussion – on what is meant by “global law”’.37 He characterizes global law 
as a ‘pattern of heavily overlapping, mutually connected and openly extended institutions, norms 
and processes’.38 He then distinguishes global law as a particular sub-set of transnational law, in 
that global law is characterized by a ‘practical endorsement of, or commitment to the universal or 
otherwise global-in-general warrant of some laws or some dimensions of law.’ 39 Thus, according to 
Walker’s extensive review of different species of global law reflected in existing scholarship: 
 
Global law ... may or may not be sourced and institutionalised at the planetary level. It 
can be more or less actively endorsed and fully realised, and more or less concrete and 
positivised in its normative claim or orientation. It can also be either universal or 
merely planetary in scope or ambition, provided it meets a threshold requirement of 
not being confined by and to any particular sub-global territorial jurisdiction. 40 
 
Global law seeks to bring some coherence to the ‘disorder of normative orders’ that is seen to 
define the contemporary post-national constellation of legal authority.41 For Dias Varella, this  
 
                                                 
34 Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change,’ n. 11 above. 
35 Halliday and Shaffer, n. 21 above, p. 4. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 1.  
38 Ibid.,  pp. 11-12, 14 and 18. 
39 Ibid., p. 55. 
40 Ibid., p. 55. 
41 N. Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Disorder of Normative Orders’ (2008) 6 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, pp. 373-96. 
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new global law is continually self-reproduced by networks of authors and highly 
specialized norms, both public and private … It is distinguished from classic national 
law in that it is not limited by national boundaries and by the lack of territorial bases, 
oftentimes by networks of invisible actors, such as markets, professional communities, 
or social networks.42 
 
Walker has placed the various divergent theories of global law into two main categories, 
convergence-promoting or divergence-accommodating approaches. The first category focuses on 
encouraging a general dynamic of legal convergence, while the second seeks to accommodate a 
general dynamic of legal divergence.43 According to Walker, what binds the two categories together 
‘is that both acknowledge and seek to address the increasing complexity of the post-national legal 
landscape – its diversity and fluidity of form, its multiplication of new forms of legally coded 
identity and difference, its congestion, its cross-systemic overlapping claims and focal concerns, its 
mechanisms of mutual recognition and interlock; and, it follows, its irreducibility to a state-
sovereigntist logic of mutually exclusive jurisdictional allocation’. 44 What remains unclear in 
Walker’s contribution, however, is the relationship of his vision of global law to classic elements of 
international law (such as a treaty objective, for instance) or potentially novel elements (global 
goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals45) as the kind of ‘universal or otherwise global-
in-general warrant’ that would distinguish global law from transnational law. This gap in Walker’s 
reflection offers an opportunity for international (environmental) lawyers to contribute to the global 
law debate more generally. 
 
This is the broader context and background for our discussion on global environmental law. Despite 
conceptual ambiguity and overlap, the foregoing visions of global law have something in common: 
a sense that the legal world and scholarship are in need of rethinking, yet new visions and concepts 
are still in the process of being formed, and basic ideas and indeed approaches are anything but 
settled. There is clearly scope for environmental lawyers to contribute to these debates, as several 
global law scholars have singled out global law phenomena in international environmental law.46 
                                                 
42 M. Dias Varella, Internationalization of Law: Globalization, International Law and Complexity (Springer, 2014), at 
p. 318. 
43 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 55. 
44 Ibid., p. 56. 
45 D. French and L. Kotze (eds), Sustainable Development Goals. Law, Theory and Implementation (Edward Elgar, 
2018). 
46 E. Morgera, ‘Global Environmental Law and the Comparative Legal Method(s)’ (2015) 24 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law pp. 254-63, at 256. 
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3.  GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP: WHERE ARE WE? 
What is global environmental law and where does global environmental law scholarship stand 
today? Also in the environmental field, a number of scholars have awakened to the need to change 
the way we think about (and research47) environmental law. This realization is reflected in the 
growing body of scholarship on transnational environmental law48 and global environmental law.49 
As this section will highlight, however, scholarship on global environmental law to date has 
assimilated the broader debate on law and globalization, and global law, to a limited degree only. 
Likewise, we assess the extent to which global environmental legal scholarship has missed so far an 
opportunity to make original contributions to the debate on global law. 
 
While the idea of global environmental law has made increasingly frequent appearances in 
environmental law scholarship since the 1990s, 50  there seems to be no uniform and detailed 
definition of what global environmental law is or what the concept means.51 Developing such an 
understanding also falls outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on taking stock of the current 
state of global environmental law scholarship in this regard. In a well-known article published in 
2009, Yang and Percival argued that global environmental law is emerging, and defined this new 
field as ‘an evolving set of substantive principles, tools, and concepts derived from elements of 
national and international environmental law.’52 According to them, it is ‘no longer possible to see 
the national environmental law systems as distinct or separate from international environmental law 
or from each other’. 53  Instead, global environmental law is ‘an amalgam of national and 
international environmental law and their interactions’.54 Yang subsequently specified that global 
environmental law is ‘a common set of environmental legal principles and norms in national, 
international, and transnational law that are utilized to protect the environment and public health as 
                                                 
47 E. Morgera, L. Parks and M. Schroeder, ‘Methodological Challenges of Transnational Environmental Law’ (SSRN, 
2019), to appear in V. Heyvaert and L.-A. Duvic-Paoli (eds.), Research Handbook of Transnational Environmental Law 
(Edward Elgar, forth 2019). 
48 For recent in depth discussion, see Heyvaert, n. 8 above. 
49 See detailed discussion and references below. 
50 R. V. Percival, ‘Global Law and the Environment’ (2011) 86(3) Washington Law Review, pp. 578-634, at 582-4 with 
figures compiled using Google’s Ngram search tool illustrating the appearance of the term ‘global environmental law’ 
in journals and books from 1940 to 2009. 
51 See, for example, E. Hey, ‘Global Environmental Law,’ (2008) Finnish Yearbook of International Law, pp. 5-28, at 6 
defining what she considers global environmental law not to be and indicating that the concept requires further 
characterization.   
52 T. Yang and R.V Percival, ‘The Emergence of Global Environmental Law’ (2009) 36(3) Ecology Law Quarterly pp. 
615-64, at 664. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
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well as to manage and conserve natural resources’. 55  One of the examples he mentioned is 
environmental impact assessment, which is found in most national legal systems as well as in 
various international environmental instruments, ‘and even as a transboundary norm’.56 Subsequent 
work by Percival highlights that global law is ‘not a set of globally harmonized regulatory standards 
but rather a term to describe the more complex set of phenomena that are occurring in several fields 
of law, in particular environmental law’.57 According to him, the term ‘global environmental law’ is 
used as it ‘appears to better capture the current complex realities of developments in the 
environmental field because transdiciplinary distinctions between domestic and international law, 
and between public and private law continue to erode’.58 
 
Some areas of international environmental law are arguably more reflective than others of the 
trends and drivers underlying the emergence of global law scholarship more generally. More than 
any other area, perhaps, this can be said of the continuously evolving and highly differentiated 
global regime on climate change mitigation and adaptation, which traverses planes of governance, 
recruits public and private actors, draws on traditional regulation and enforcement as well as 
facilitation and flexible market approaches, and encompasses difficult questions of global justice 
and responsibility. Still, most environmental problems are inherently transboundary and cross-
cutting in nature, and require action at all levels and by multiple actors for an effective resolution. It 
should therefore be no surprise that global environmental law has been one of the earliest thematic 
areas to see proliferation of global law scholarship, and that trend is likely to continue. 
 
In line with broader literature on global and transnational law, global environmental law scholarship 
has called attention to common themes that challenge our traditional understandings of 
environmental law, the most notable of which is the growing importance of non-state actors. Hey 
highlights the role of non-state actors actively interacting with states and global institutions 
involved in environmental decision making, as well as participating in standard setting, for 
example, through voluntary codes of conduct.59 Percival emphasizes that ‘private parties are now 
playing a major role in the emergence of global environmental law’.60 While the relevance of non-
state actors in international environmental law has already been described in the abundant literature 
                                                 
55 T. Yang, ’The Emerging Practice of Global Environmental Law’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 
53-65, at 54. 
56 Ibid.   
57 Percival, n. 50 above, p. 633.  
58 Ibid., p. 584. 
59 Hey, ‘Global Environmental Law’, n. 51 above, pp. 6-7. 
60 Percival, n. 50 above, p. 624. 
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on environmental governance and soft law, the question of whether the cumulative effects of these 
complex changes signals an existential crisis of international and national environmental law has 
been posed, but not exhaustively addressed in the incipient global environmental law scholarship. 
 
Even if the notion ‘global law’ may instinctively bring to mind the idea of a distinct body of law 
that applies universally or globally, no strong and explicit argument has been made of global 
environmental law as a separate body of law in the sense that some environmental norms would or 
should apply globally across legal systems and jurisdictions regardless of their formal pedigree. 
This aligns with Walker’s argument that the notion ‘global law’ does not refer to the law’s pedigree, 
but to its global destination.61 Hey, for example, has described various substantive and procedural 
environmental principles in order to provide an overview of the discourse of global environmental 
law, while at the same time noting that most, if not all, of the principles she discusses ‘are part of 
treaty law, while many also qualify as customary law’.62 This implies that she does not consider 
these principles to be universally applicable merely by virtue of them being part of global 
environmental law. Morgera in turn has rather underscored the need to engage with global 
environmental law as a research and teaching agenda: 
 
A perspective informed by global environmental law, understood as the promotion of 
environmental protection through a plurality of legal mechanisms relying on a 
plurality of legal orders, thus prompts the study of environmental law at the 
international, regional, national and sub-national levels as inter-related and mutually 
influencing systems.63 
While not discarding the need to explore whether: 
the practice of global environmental law can lead to innovative forms of law, be that 
the result of an increasingly conscious and strategic reliance on the mutual influences 
between different legal orders, or of the jurisgenerative role of global scholars and 
practitioners.64 
 
                                                 
61 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above. 
62 Hey, ‘Global Environmental Law’, n. 51 above, p. 10. 
63 E. Morgera, ‘Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-judicial Enforcement of Global Public Goods 
in the Context of Global Environmental Law’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law pp. 743-67, at 746. 
64 Morgera, ‘Global Environmental Law and the Comparative Legal Methods’, n. 46 above, p. 263 (footnotes omitted: 
the reference to the jurisgenerative role of global scholars is to N. Walker, ‘The Jurist in a Global Age’ in R van Gestel 
et al (eds.), Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 84-111 ). 
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Most of global environmental law scholarship seems to be empirically based, highlighting various 
rapid and groundbreaking changes that scholars and practitioners are witnessing on the ground. To 
that end, its main contribution to date has been methodological. According to Morgera, global 
environmental law: 
 
… further calls for an analysis of the practice of non-State actors, particularly 
international organizations, international networks of experts providing advice on 
environmental legislation across the globe, international civil society, bilateral donors, 
indigenous peoples and local communities and the private sector.65 
 
Along similar lines, an important part of global environmental law scholarship highlights the 
globalization of environmental law practice,66  and the ensuing demands on environmental law 
scholars and practitioners. According to Yang, international environmental law used to be seen 
largely as a specialized area of public international law, outside the expertise of national 
environmental lawyers.67  Similarly, those working on international environmental law tended to 
leave questions of domestic environmental law to national law experts. However, this situation has 
quickly changed. There is now a greater need for domestic environmental law practice to be 
informed by international law, and for international environmental lawyers to understand the 
operation and requirements of national environmental law systems.68 The emergence of ‘global 
jurists’ is also a key notion emerging from Walker’s work discussed above.69 
 
While there is no explicit argument that global environmental law constitutes an ensemble of 
universally valid norms, a firmly embedded notion in global environmental law scholarship is the 
idea that legal concepts travel globally between jurisdictions and other normative systems. 
According to Yang and Percival, ‘The globalization of environmental law means that regulatory 
approaches, legal principles, and institutional structures will be similar or have analogues across 
different national and international systems’. 70  Their spread is partly related to the common 
physical and technological origins of environmental problems, the common scientific and 
technological basis for resolving them, and the objective of global environmental law to address 
                                                 
65 Morgera, ‘Bilaterlaism at the Service of Community Interests‘, n. 63 above, p. 255. 
66 Yang, n. 55 above, p. 56. 
67 Ibid., p. 55.  
68 Ibid., pp. 55-6; E. Morgera, ‘The Future of Law and the Environment: The Emergence of Global Environmental Law’ 
in S. Muller et al. (eds.), The Law of the Future and the Future of Law (Torkel Opsahl Academic, 2012) pp. 39-49. 
69 Walker, ‘Mapping the Disorder of Normative Orders’, n. 41 above. 
70 Yang and Percival, n. 52 above, p. 652.  
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common interest problems that cannot be resolved by any state on its own. 71  Transnational 
environmental litigation is also contributing to this trend;72 the rise in climate change litigation 
across the globe, for instance, has been partly driven by efforts to promote the development of 
climate law in different jurisdictions across the globe.  
 
In terms of methodology, there has been only limited scholarly reflection thus far on what the study 
of global (environmental) law requires, and how this nascent field differs, for example, from the 
study of international (environmental) law. While most ‘grand theories’ of law – such as those 
formulated by  Hart and Kelsen – are global in the sense that they argue something universal about 
the general nature of law,73 Section 4 below will show that global environmental law implicitly or 
explicitly challenges key aspects of such theories. With its starting point in complex and observable 
developments, such as the diverse manifestations of globalization, global law defies the conceptual 
abstraction and simplicity of such ‘grand theories’. Altogether, its remit is theoretical as much as it 
is applied, inviting the question of whether ‘a genuinely global view of law’ is possible if legal 
cultures are different and ‘harmonization plagued by legal-culture–related difficulties.’74 According 
to Husa, therefore, ‘a global way of conceiving law means that also legal theories need to be re-
established and denationalized’.75 He has identified the need for methodological pluralism – i.e. the 
need for multiple methods to study multiple legalities76 – and noted that: 
 
Nationally oriented legal doctrine seems poorly equipped to meet pluralist forms of 
overlapping, interdependent, and sometimes competing non-national normativities … 
Other approaches, such as comparative, economic and anthropological methods are 
needed alongside a more conventional doctrinal approach.77 
 
Thus far, only a limited amount of global environmental law scholarship has reflected on legal 
research methods for global environmental law. The main focus of the limited body of existing 
literature concerns the relevance of comparative methods. Wiener’s work illustrates the borrowing 
and travel of ideas and legal concepts, such as emissions trading, from national environmental law 
                                                 
71 Hey, ‘Global Environmental Law’, n. 51 above. 
72 Percival, n. 50 above, pp. 601 ff. 
73 Husa, n. 2 above, p. 100. 
74 Ibid., p. 103. 
75 Ibid., p. 113. 
76 Ibid., p. 130. 
77 Ibid., p. 132. 
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to international environmental law,78 whereas the travel of legal norms and ideas from international 
to national environmental laws is a well-known phenomenon. Morgera has looked into inter-related 
dynamics of norm diffusion across different international environmental regimes, between 
multilateral and bilateral treaties and mechanisms, as well as through negotiating practices at 
different levels.79 Comparative lawyers’ interest in different forms of ‘contact’ between different 
legal phenomena appears useful to foster in international environmental lawyers an appreciation of 
diversity in local influence and global patterns.80  Equally, comparatists’ acknowledgement that 
various open-ended and self-reflexive methodologies are needed to fully appreciate mutual 
dependencies between legal phenomena is helpful to recognize the risks involved in this kind of 
research and identify biases, such as the assumption that global environmental law phenomena are 
desirable or innovative. 81  These considerations had already emerged in Twining’s broader 
reflections on global law. 82  There are, however, bound to be multiple methodological and 
conceptual implications of global environmental law that have not yet been identified, let alone 
adequately captured by existing scholarship. Some of the most obvious ones relate to those aspects 
of global environmental law that directly challenge our received notions concerning valid law and 
state monopoly on legitimate lawmaking. As we indicate below in Section 4, there is a need to 
engage with these issues in greater depth and rigour than past global environmental law scholarship 
has done. 
 
Overall, global environmental law scholarship has focused on developing a more comprehensive 
and inclusive vision of environmental law that reaches beyond the established categories of 
international and national law and takes into consideration actors and sources that traditional legal 
doctrines have deemed irrelevant. It has drawn attention to global travel of legal concepts and 
mutual influences and interdependencies between different legal systems and levels of regulation. It 
has also highlighted the increasingly global outlook of environmental law as a profession. In doing 
so, global environmental law scholarship echoes key themes from the broader discussion on global 
law. On the whole, however, global environmental law scholarship has only sporadically engaged 
with the more theoretical academic debate on global law and its deeper reflections on questions of 
                                                 
78 J. B. Wiener, ‘Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global 
Environmental Law’, (2001) 27(4) Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 1295-372. 
79 Morgera, ‘Bilaterlaism at the Service of Community Interests‘, n. 63 above, and E. Morgera, ’The Need for an 
International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law, 
pp. 353-83.  
80 Morgera, ‘Global Environmental Law and the Comparative Legal Method(s)’,  n. 46 above, pp. 254-63. 
81 Ibid. See also Morgera, Parks and Schroeder, n. 47 above. 
82 W. Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’ (2004) 36(49) Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 
(2004), pp. 1-45, at 1. 
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power and influence behind global legal phenomena and unexpected interactions among legal 
sources at different levels.83 One exception is Hey, who has invited international environmental 
lawyers to engage with global administrative law84 in the face of the growing importance and 
limited accountability of non-state actors exercising public powers, and of global institutions85 that 
still reflect the legacy of colonialism.86  
 
4. GLOBAL (ENVIRONMENTAL) LAW AS ‘LAW’: CHALLENGE AND PROMISE 
What are the implications of the global (environmental) law research agenda, and what epistemic 
and normative challenges does it entail? While emerging conceptions of global law and global 
environmental law may be characterized by conceptual ambiguity and fluid boundaries, they 
nonetheless reflect a common perception that traditional notions of law and legal authority are 
unable to capture the shifting realities of rule-based governance in a fragmented, polycentric world. 
What unites the different visions and interpretations of global – and thus also global environmental 
– law is a shared view that contemporary affairs are marked by a rise of normative arrangements 
that transcend or challenge conventional horizons of domestic and international law, an increased 
functional differentiation and permeability of public and private authority, and a growing role in 
rulemaking and implementation of actors beyond the state.  
 
Our argument, however, is that the project of global (environmental) law necessarily extends 
beyond mere observation and recording of changes on the ground. Views such as that expressed by 
Teubner – according to whom the ‘emerging global … law is a legal order in its own right’87 – 
reveal an ambition of the proponents of global law to offer more than the impartial representation of 
observed facts. Even where scholars have conceded that global law is not a discrete system of 
norms or legal practice, they have described it in terms of its directionality and thereby invoked a 
transformative agenda, 88  as described earlier in this article. Inherent to much of the global 
                                                 
83 Morgera, ‘Global Environmental Law and the Comparative Legal Method(s)’,  n. 46 above . 
84 See, e.g., B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch & R. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems, pp. 15-62; N. Krisch & B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global 
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law, pp. 1-13; B. 
Kingsbury, ‘Global Environmental Law as Administration: Implications for International Law’, in D. Bodansky, J. 
Brunnée & E. Hey (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
63-84. 
85 E. Hey, ‘Global Environmental Law and Global Institutions: A System Lacking “Good Process” ’, in: R. Pierik and 
W. Werner (eds.), Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 45-72, at 45. 
86 Ibid, p. 46. 
87 Teubner, n. 18 above, p. 2. 
88 Global law, according to Walker, is ‘an adjectival rather than a nominal category’ that ‘does not specify any 
particular source or pedigree, and so may account for itself in many different ways and may claim or assume authority 
 16 
(environmental) law debate is, in other words, a normative component, an apparent aspiration to 
revisit questions about the validity of norms and, ultimately, the ontology of law itself. This has also 
been picked up by Walker, who indicated that global law finds itself in between settled doctrine and 
an aspirational approach89 in which specialist (professional and academic) communities are not only 
‘sources of expertise and learning in matters of the emergent global law and as instruments of its 
application’, but also ‘active players in the fashioning and shaping of global law’.90 
 
It is that dimension of global law which has elicited discomfort among more traditionally-minded 
legal scholars, prompting questions about whether global law is, indeed, ‘law’. 91  It is also a 
dimension that does not seem to be adequately captured in the existing body of global 
environmental scholarship and that would merit more careful attention. To the extent that global 
law narratives espouse a normative component, they transcend the boundary between empirical 
statements of ‘what is’ and normative yearnings of what ‘ought to be’, and, by extension, challenge 
received definitions of what constitutes valid law. For mainstream lawyers, the distinction between 
law and other normative categories lies at the very epicentre of their profession and is, in many 
ways, constitutive of legal practice.92 Although views on the exact demarcation between law and 
other sources of normativity have varied over time across different schools of jurisprudence and 
moral or political philosophy,93  contemporary lawyers will by and large tend to premise their 
                                                                                                                                                                  
on many different grounds’; yet at the same time, it ‘modifies law’s canonical forms’ and ‘claims a global warrant and 
makes a global appeal in the sense of claiming or assuming a universal or globally pervasive justification for its 
application’; global law, thus, becomes defined by reference to ‘its destination rather than its source’, idem, n. 20 above, 
pp. 19-22. 
89 See Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 22 and p. 26. 
90 Ibid., p. 31 and more generally pp. 31-8. 
91 See e.g. R. Collins, ‘The Slipperiness of “Global Law”’ (2017) 37 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 714–39, at 
715: ‘does the accumulation of these globalising trends, and the attempt to accommodate these post-national legal 
forms, give rise to something that can be coherently described as “global law”?’; M. Loughlin, ‘The Misconceived 
Search for Global Law’ (2017) 8 Transnational Legal Theory, pp. 353-59, at357: ‘rather than examining these 
institutions as some new species whose existence might give rise to a new genus of law, the questions become more 
prosaic … Are these new regimes derivative institutions or have they been able to acquire an autonomous status?’; see 
also the three special issues of the Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, dedicated to a 
forum titled ‘The Case for Global Law – Is Global Law True Law?’, (2005-2007) 5-7 The Global Community Yearbook 
of International Law and Jurisprudence. 
92 As, for instance, Weber has argued, a sharp boundary between legal and other social norms is indispensable for the 
formal rationality of the law, see M. Weber, Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth & C. Wittich, translated by E. 
Fischoff (University of California Press, 1978), at p. 657. 
93 Debate has, in particular, focused on whether the legal validity of a norm is purely conditional on its source and form, 
or also – and even primarily – on its content, with legal positivism as first set forth by scholars such as Jeremy Bentham 
and John Austin – and rooted in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes – typically associated with the former 
position, see B.H. Bix, ‘Legal Positivism’, in M.P. Golding & W.A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell, 2005), pp. 29-49; and various traditions of natural law, including 
early variations of the concept in Greece and Rome, the Christian scholasticism of St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and 
the School of Salamanca in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and the contractual and rational (Verunftrecht) 
variations advanced by Enlightenment scholars such as Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Emmerich de Vattel, with the latter, see J. Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The Classical Tradition’, 
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recognition of valid law on an accepted doctrine of legal sources, usually expressed by way of a 
posited social fact. 
 
This view, which has seen its greatest theoretical elaboration in the jurisprudential tradition of legal 
positivism,94 assumes the existence of conventions which determine certain facts or events taken to 
yield established ways for the creation, modification, and annulment of legal norms; these ‘facts are 
the sources of law conventionally identified as such in each and every modern legal system’.95 At 
the domestic level, sources of valid law will commonly be defined in a national constitution, and 
entail adoption by state bodies – such as a legislature – and adjudication through an ordained 
procedure; at the international level, acknowledgment of a recognized canon of legal sources has 
likewise become a matter of doctrinal practice,96 as reflected in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.97 What both have in common is an innate connection to the state.98 
 
In its diverse formulations, global law acknowledges these established sources,99 but treats them as 
a mere starting point for its central focus on legal norms beyond the state, whose regulatory 
monopoly it rejects.100 Motivated by the hypothesis of a declining role of states,101 this alternative 
                                                                                                                                                                  
in J.L. Coleman, K.E. Himma & S.J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 1-60. 
94 Most recently, notable proponents of this jurisprudential tradition have included Hart and Kelsen. For them, a norm is 
valid if it derives its validity from another norm; legal orders are thus comprised of hierarchies of norms, all of which 
are grounded in a basic norm, which Hart identifies as the Rule of Recognition, a social practice among officials, and 
Kelsen conceives of as the Grundnorm, a transcendental norm whose existence is presupposed. See H. L. A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961), at p. 97, and H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Deuticke, 1934), at p. 66. 
95 A. Marmor & A. Sarch, ‘The Nature of Law’, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015), 
available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/lawphil-nature. As Raz has highlighted, however, most 
legal orders allow the content of rules to influence the determination of legal validity, most notably at the adjudication 
stage, see J. Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), at pp. 78-80. 
96 D. Patterson, ‘Transnational Governance Regimes’, in J. Kammerhofer & J. d’Aspremont (eds.), International Legal 
Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 401-20, at 402. 
97 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), San Francisco (United States), 26 June 1945, in force 24 Oct. 1945. 
Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf (Annex). Its Art. 38(1) famously lists as the 
primary sources applicable to disputes brought before it ‘international conventions, whether general or particular’, 
‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’, and ‘the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations’. 
98 Describing this mainstream perspective on sources of valid law as ‘theories of the “law-state” … The nation-state is 
the source of law, the state is jurisdictionally limited, and nothing can be ‘law’ that is not produced or at least 
sanctioned by the state’, K.C. Culver & M. Giudice, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), at p. xxiv. 
99 In folding ‘laws’ or ‘dimensions of law’ within its own terms [global law] takes for granted existing legal forms and 
their defining criteria and merely supplements or modifies them as circumstantially appropriate with reference to the 
notion of a ‘universal or otherwise global-in-general warrant’. Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 19. 
100 H. Lindahl, ‘Legal Order and the “Globality” of Global Law’, in S. Musa & E. de Volder (eds.), Reflections on 
Global Law (Brill, 2013), pp. 36-44, at 37. 
101 Note, however, that the evidence of such decline is presently still inconclusive, B. Jessop, The State: Past, Present, 
Future (Polity, 2016), Chapter 8. 
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perspective reaches well outside the traditional canon of accepted sources, embracing a broad 
variety of public and private norms that ‘overlap or overlay each other in criss-crossing patterns of 
normativity’.102 In the resulting paradigm, conventional sources are afforded a diminished role 
relative to the opinions of academics and international civil society;103 indeed, as Walker describes 
it, ‘some of the more powerful instances of global law … are of the pre-positive or non-positive 
variety.’104 
 
Such propensity to lessen the importance of traditional sources doctrine is but one avenue through 
which global law softens the dividing line between legal and other norms, challenging the 
distinctiveness of law and, in so doing, the unity which traditionally defines a legal order. 105 
Another is the ready acceptance of norms with varying degrees of normativity and binding effect, 
including ‘soft law’ – such as the decisions, recommendations or codes of good practice adopted by 
international and national organizations106 – and contractual arrangements governed by private law 
whose legal effect has traditionally been confined to parties.107 This fluidity of global law again 
departs from the more rigid understanding of normativity in much of jurisprudence. Over the course 
of legal history, the stipulations enshrined in law have been commonly seen as binary in nature, 
rather than a matter of degree: law is either valid, or it is not; it is either binding, or it is not.108 
Concern about the implications of ‘relative normativity’ 109  has prompted some scholars to 
altogether reject notions such as ‘soft law’,110 whereas attempts to derive broader legal effects from 
                                                 
102 Lindahl, n. 100 above, p. 36. 
103 Dias Varella, n. 42 above, p. 318: ‘Legislative processes become less important based on the rise and specialization 
of other sources of norms’; Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 129: ‘Court judgments and treaties and 
their established dramatis personae remain important, but other actors … a wider range of domestic civil society and 
other transnational non-state actors, and, notably, the academic sponsors themselves, are vital players in the process of 
reframing’. See also N. Walker, ‘Out of Place and Out of Time: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates’ (2010) 14 Edinburgh Law 
Review, pp. 13-46, at 17. 
104 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 23. 
105 Dias Varella, n. 42 above, p. 318, stating that ‘the idea of the unity of the law breaks down in the face of the 
multiplicity of sources.’ 
106 Tuori, n. 12 above, p. 17; on the normativity of decisions by international organisations, see J. Brunnée, ‘COPing 
with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International 
Law, pp. 1-52; C. Redgwell, ‘Sources of International Environmental Law: Formality and Informality in the Dynamic 
Evolution of International Environmental Law Norms’, in S. Besson & J. d’Aspremont (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 939-59. 
107 Dilling & Markus, n. 32 above. 
108 See, for instance, D. Hume, ‘A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part II’, in S.D. Warner & D.W. Livingston 
(eds.), David Hume: Political Writings (Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 1-79, at 43-5, stating that ‘[h]alf rights 
and obligations, which seem so natural in common life’ are, when it comes to applying the law, nothing else but 
‘perfect absurdities’. 
109 P. Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’, (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law, 
pp. 413-42, at 417-8: ‘the threshold does exist: on one side of the line, there is born a legal obligation that can be relied 
on before a court or arbitrator, the flouting of which constitutes an internationally wrongful act giving rise to 
international responsibility; on the other side, there is nothing of the kind.’ 
110 J. Klabbers, ‘The Redundancy of Soft Law’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law, pp. 167-182. 
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private law activity have been met with their own concerns.111 Not all legal scholars share this 
view, 112  however. There are several areas of international practice, including the area of 
environmental protection, that arguably illustrate the legal significance of soft law.113  
 
All this should not suggest that global law ignores traditional or mainstream conceptions of law. 
Walker concedes that, for global law to have a legal claim and be more than an aspiration, it must 
retain an ‘element of establishment’.114 Dilling and Markus contend that informal and private norms 
still ‘have to be “re-embedded” into well-established political and legal processes’ and 
‘complemented, endorsed or limited by formal legal structures’ to have legal effect.115 As for the 
question of relative normativity, even proponents of the global law project have shown reluctance to 
abandon the dichotomy of legal and other norms, opting instead for alternative rationalizations of 
variable normativity.116 In what might be described as an ‘ironic circularity’,117 global law seems to 
draw its legal pedigree from an initial anchoring in received sources, but simultaneously holds ‘out 
an additional, independent normative claim that is taken to transcend the boundaries of existing 
legal categories.’118 
 
But for that latter dimension, one could conclude that global law is little more than a labelling 
exercise, an ‘empirical mapping of scholarly trends and the fluid dynamics of the globalisation of 
legal study and practice’119 that assembles elements of lex lata and lex ferenda around a connective 
                                                 
111 Dilling & Markus, n. 32 above. 
112 J. Pauwelyn, ‘Is It International Law or Not, and Does It Even Matter?’, in J. Pauwelyn, R. Wessel, and J. Wouters 
(eds.), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 125-61, at  128-9. Given the divergent 
views, D’Aspremont has suggested that the ‘impression is nowadays rife that the international legal scholarship has 
become a cluster of different scholarly communities, each using their different criteria for the ascertainment of 
international legal rules’, J. d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2011), at p. 3. 
113 See, for instance, A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP, 2007), at pp. 210-29. 
114 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 171: ‘Vitally, there must and there does remain an element of 
establishment in global law. Without some claim as to its current applicability—to its already possessing a rule-like 
quality—global law could simply not satisfy any meaningful operative definition of law. That is to say, the claim of 
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(emphasis in the original). His taxonomy of global law, in fact, incorporates the ‘formal’ manifestation of global legal 
relations and the ‘pedigree’ of international norms as one of the seven ‘species’ of global law. Ibid., pp. 63-70. 
115 Dilling & Markus, n. 32 above. 
116 G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell, 1993), at p. 90, notes that whereas the legal validity of a legal 
norm is an either/or question, its social validity ‘can be a matter of degree. The interference of legal and social norms 
transforms their validity from a question of “either-or” to one of “more or less”’. 
117 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 162: ‘As we shall see, there is an ironic circularity at work in the 
combination of these various factors – an irresolution and awareness of the relativity of perspectives and partiality of 
solutions that breeds further unsettlement’. 
118 Collins, n. 91 above, p. 719; see also Dias Varella, n. 42 above, p. 314: ‘It is a set of rules that draws not only on 
international law but also on the set of internationalized domestic law norms, as well as the various legal processes 
among private actors, such as firms and civil society, that unfold independent of nation-states’. 
119 Collins, n. 91 above, p. 719. 
 20 
tissue, their shared ‘global warrant’.120 Of these elements, some are accepted variants of binding 
domestic and international law, some reside in a penumbra of contested, but evolving normativity, 
and some, finally, lie in the realm of aspiration, or, as Walker describes it, are reflections of a 
presumptive ‘destination’ of the law.121 Global law would not endeavour to represent a new and 
separate realm of law – with its own sources, institutions, and doctrines – operating alongside more 
established areas of law, but rather pursue the – no less modest – epistemic ambition to frame 
developments across various planes of public and private authority whose rapid expansion and 
complex interactions call for a new conceptual paradigm, a ‘unique mode of thinking about law in a 
global context’.122 
 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, such an interpretation of the global law project would be too simple a 
dismissal of its normative thrust, and would risk underestimating its constitutive power. If nothing 
else, by calling it global ‘law’, the concept – intentionally or not – implies a claim to legality that 
goes beyond mere description. For Walker, discourses on global law provide a channel for legal 
scholars and professionals to effectively reformulate what counts as a valid legal argument under 
conditions of globalization; these ‘specialists of global law … become involved in “taking law to 
the world” through various different but mutually reinforcing modes and gradations of 
jurisgenerative activity’.123 It is precisely in that contested space between ‘constructive discovery or 
creative projection’124 that the promise and potential pitfalls of global law reside. For wherever 
global law purports the existence of norms beyond traditional forms and sources, it must also raise 
questions about the authority to adopt such norms, their legitimacy, and accountability for their 
implementation.125 
 
That is also where global law simultaneously faces its greatest vulnerability and can realize its 
greatest promise. Law on all levels has endured perennial accusations of a democratic deficit. 
International law, in particular, has been the target of scathing critique, with its current practice 
likened to the triumph of an unelected and bureaucratic Hofmafia over the true will of international 
society.126  But criticism has also been levelled against domestic law, where the legitimacy of 
                                                 
120 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, p. 22. 
121 Ibid., p. 21. 
122 Collins, n. 91 above, p. 719. 
123 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, n. 20 above, pp. 52-53. 
124 Ibid., p. 70. 
125 As Patterson puts it, ‘[b]y what authority are norms created by non-state actors? In virtue of what are those norms 
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126 See P. Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford University Press, 1990), at pp. 243-53; idem, The 
Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, 2002), at pp. 380-98. From a very 
 21 
legislators – based on, at best, highly aggregative representation and a thin veneer of accountability 
through infrequent and flawed elections – has been censored as a wanting basis of political 
authority.127 Still, in our liquid modernity, where faith in universal truths has been largely replaced 
by a pluralism of values and ideas,128 normative frameworks have been unable to offer a lasting 
alternative to the frail legitimacy of formal, posited law.129 
 
Against this persistent tension between flawed facts and unredeemed norms, an alternative 
foundation for the validity of law could find new traction through the transformative potential of 
global law: deliberative democracy. Based on different strands of newer social and political theory, 
yet eminently practical in its aspiration, it seeks to close the legitimacy gap through an observable 
social fact, namely strengthened participation in a process of pluralist deliberation. In the place of 
an ordained and, ultimately, contestable truth, it calls for an inclusive process of collective 
reasoning and active public debate.130 Different approaches have been suggested to actualize such a 
model of deliberative democracy, from the public reasoning process evoked by Rawls131 to the 
communicative rationality and ideal discourse outlined by Habermas.132 What these approaches 
have in common, however, is inclusive participation and equality of access for free and autonomous 
individuals, groups, and interests, including those who have been historically marginalized in 
collective decision making. 133  Anchored in such deliberation, law becomes the medium for 
transforming communicative power into administrative power, a means for making civic will 
                                                                                                                                                                  
different starting point, see also A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004), at p. 8: ‘the 
diversity of the peoples to be governed makes it almost impossible to conceive of a global demos.’ 
127 Inequities of wealth and influence, a passive citizenry, and vast information asymmetries among its members have 
been cited as shortcomings of modern democratic processes, rendering them ‘locations for strategic gamesmanship’ 
rather than genuine deliberation, see J. F. Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (MIT 
Press, 2000), at pp. 18-24. 
128 See, generally, Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Polity, 2000); U. Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine 
andere Moderne (Suhrkamp, 1986); A.C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988). 
129 Throughout history, normative claims based on celestial authority, natural justice, or some other foundational 
premise have sought to provide a moral corrective for the shortfalls of secular law, yet time and again they have also 
been rejected for their contingency and frequent instrumentalisation for factional ends. 
130 See, generally, J.S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford 
University Press, 2000). A. Gutmann & D. Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
131 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), at p. 214: ‘public reason is the reason of equal 
citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in 
amending their constitution.’ 
132 For the theoretical foundations of his approach, see J. Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zu einer Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns (Suhrkamp, 1984), at pp. 177-8. 
133 See, e.g., Rawls, n. 131 above, at p. 306; J. Habermas, ‘Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks 
on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism’ (1995) 92 Journal of Philosophy, pp. 109-31, at 117; on the importance of 
participation as ‘the right of rights’, see J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1996), Chapters 
11 and 13. 
 22 
formation effective in solving societal challenges.134 In actual practice, a perfect consensus based on 
the foregoing ideal of democratic deliberation may remain elusive in a socially complex and 
morally divided world,135 but that does not lessen its desirability,136 and may even have its own 
advantages;137 its pursuit, moreover, creates a theoretical entry point for global law to enrich and 
strengthen legal ordering on multiple levels.  
 
With its responsiveness to the fluidity of public authority in a postnational world, and its proximity 
to pluralist conceptions of normativity and justice in the international order, global law offers an 
opportunity for enhanced deliberation and inclusivity. It expands the range of relevant actors to 
subnational jurisdictions, private corporations, minorities, and civil society more generally, and can 
thereby help bridge the spatial and temporal distance between those who generate the law and those 
whose lives are governed by it. This acquires particular importance in an environmental context,138 
where important stakeholders – including future generations and the natural environment itself – are 
routinely excluded from existing democratic processes, 139  and now may be given a voice by 
dedicated interest groups. Stronger involvement of technical experts and affected communities can 
improve the substantive quality of environmental governance, better ground it in local conditions,140 
and thereby impart an alternative form of legitimacy. 141  Altogether, greater participation in 
democratic processes has been linked to improved environmental outcomes by generating public 
support for relevant policies, enhancing institutional capacities of public agencies, and adding a 
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layer of accountability that state actors alone cannot provide.142 Baber and Bartlett go so far as to 
declare that a deliberative approach is therefore vital ‘for environmental law to attain global 
reach.’143  
 
Still, for global law to realize this vision and help the democratic processes that precede law 
formation and implementation ‘catch up with the forces of a globalized economy’,144 it must meet 
certain conditions. Collective choices have to originate in reasoned debate and public justification, 
rather than be made ‘by blind acceptance of the views of established authorities, by deals concluded 
among vested interests, or by recourse to intimidation’.145 Discussing the legal quality of global 
administrative law, Kingsbury has posited a set of principles and practices that, in his view, are 
constitutive of legality in the public sphere: rationality, proportionality, rule of law, justification, 
publicity, and transparency. 146  Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, in turn, have highlighted that 
‘traditional international law, based as it is on state consent, does not have a monopoly on 
legitimate cooperation’.147 Indeed, in addition to formal state consent, legitimacy at the international 
level can also come from ‘expertise, an open and inclusive process of deliberation, or the 
implementation of effective outcomes’.148  As a conclusion from their comprehensive study of 
informal international lawmaking, they observe that ‘the emerging code of good practice for the 
development of standards or new forms of cooperation outside international law is normatively 
thicker’ than the traditional validation requirements for international law in the sense of a more 
inclusive, transparent and predictable process, the involvement of more diverse and expert actors, 
and more carefully and coherently elaborated output.149 They have therefore called for a newly 
calibrated set of criteria that better reflects evolving circumstances,150 also likening such criteria to 
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the test of ‘thick stakeholder consensus’.151 At the same time, they highlight the crucial role of 
domestic oversight, arguing that ‘to ensure domestic democratic legitimacy, a minimum degree of 
parliamentary or congressional oversight (not necessarily formal consent) of all international 
cooperation that affects public policy-making or individual freedom – treaty or not, formal or 
informal – must be available’.152 Krisch, in contrast, has argued that legitimacy can be realized in a 
global legal order by fostering public autonomy – that is, by allowing citizens to choose the 
conditions of their own association – and deliberating contested issues through a pluralist process in 
which competing associations exercise mutual toleration.153  
 
Compelling arguments have thus been made for a postnational model of democracy, in which the 
state and its formal processes are neither indispensable nor sufficient for legitimate and accountable 
governance, 154  and indeed borders and jurisdictions are themselves open to democratic 
deliberation.155 For now, however, it remains unclear whether such aspirations are met in practice, 
and whether the conditions of open and equal deliberation are possible in those new contexts that 
stand to supplant or complement traditional state authority in a globalizing world. On a conceptual 
level, for instance, Stewart has expressed concern that global regulatory bodies will give greater 
regard to the particular interests and concerns of powerful states and well-organized economic 
actors, while disregarding the often peripheral interests and concerns of more weakly organized and 
less powerful groups and vulnerable individuals.156 At a minimum, that cautions against abandoning 
the electoral processes and procedural guarantees that have generated legitimacy in existing state 
polities, suggesting that hybrid forms of governance – which combine the legitimizing structures of 
the state with deliberation and contestation beyond the state – may offer greater hope of closing 
current legitimacy gaps than either states or non-state actors would alone.157 
 
A survey of current postnational activities in the arena of climate cooperation seems to support this 
assessment. At a time when several national governments are held captive by populist and 
nationalist political movements and have begun to withdraw from established channels of 
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environmental diplomacy and rulemaking, the sheer scale and reach of such activities across 
alternative non-state venues is nothing short of remarkable, and welcome in its own right as a 
counterpoint to state retrenchment or paralysis.158 As early evaluations of the underlying initiatives 
and processes have shown, however, these efforts do not, by and large, meet the foregoing criteria, 
and are thus unlikely to serve as a corrective to the deficient legitimacy and accountability of 
traditional environmental law.159 An empirical survey of climate initiatives involving non-state 
actors leads Bäckstrand and Kuyper to conclude that ‘transparency and accountability mechanisms 
are nascent at best, nonexistent at worse’, 160  while Widerberg and Pattberg find that shifting 
patterns of authority in climate governance have ‘made it increasingly difficult to understand who 
should be accountable to whom’.161 Sheer effectiveness in remedying an environmental threat could 
compensate for the attested shortfall in procedural legitimacy,162 but there, again, the track record of 
informal climate initiatives has so far been questionable.163 Overall, the role of non-state actors in 
the ‘promotion of transparency, consultation, evaluation and correction in global regulatory bodies’ 
appears to have ‘remained modest, both in absolute terms and relative to the needs’.164 
 
While this conclusion, if sustained into the future, would be regrettable, it only reflects an 
unfulfilled potential and, as such, a missed opportunity. It should then be a void that has yet to be 
filled. Of greater concern, however, are assertions that global law, far from enhancing the 
legitimacy of rule-based governance, has actually had the opposite effect. For Collins, the claimed 
‘globality’ of global law risks conveying a false sense of universalism, helping to legitimize what 
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would otherwise be arbitrary local or particular concerns and interests.165 And it is hard to ignore 
this risk. In his enyclopedic digest of the global law project, Walker repeatedly discusses the 
important role of ‘academic elites’ in advancing global law narratives, a cryptic society of 
‘specialists’ operating in ‘close-knit … association’ and ‘led by narrow elites with privileged access 
to resources, knowledge and networks’ that are possessed of ‘convergent world-views and an 
extensive sphere of influence’.166 One might then ask what influence marginalized communities 
will have in defining the material content and ‘destination’ of global law – a system of norms that 
affects and purportedly protects them. 
 
For Loughlin, global law manifests a triumph of regulatory technique, a science of the 
‘administration of things’ that asks to replace ‘the idea of law as the expression of will, and 
especially the will of political majorities.’167 He sees global law as ‘the expression of a type of 
instrumental reason’,168 yet that invariably begs the question: whose instrumental reason?169 Dias 
Varella, one of the few developing country scholars working on this topic, has described the 
challenge of global law as follows: ‘the challenge would be to maintain the differences that exist 
among nations without imposing a fusion of national legal rules, much less imposing legal norms 
inspired by hegemonic powers, while at the same time constructing some type of global order or, at 
least, an ordered legal space’.170 It is this risk of instrumental appropriation which has compelled 
scholars such as Koskenniemi to identify themselves with a formalist, yet politically aware 
conception of law, which they believe provides a more impartial and, ultimately, more just 
foundation for the diplomatic relations of states.171 
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This is a powerful critique that merits being taken seriously. In as much as global law aspires to a 
normative ideal – what Walker describes as ‘globally defensible good reasons for its invocation’172 
– it invariably also introduces a measure of contingency; its normative claim cannot be simply 
substantiated with reference to established source criteria or other constituent rules of legal systems 
already in force.173 Walker acknowledges this when he concedes that the attendant projection of 
global law involves ‘a gambit, a calculated risk that its explicit self-sponsorship as a form of law 
should not be undermined by a lack of prior authorisation’.174 For some, this gambit strains the 
limits of acceptability, based on an ‘almost maddeningly schizophrenic account of what global law 
is’ and, by extension, what it is not;175 yet while the inherent ambiguities may caution against 
invoking the ‘inevitability’ of this ‘[p]rojected yet oblique, unsettled yet inexorable’ project,176 
there can also be no question that global law offers an intriguing vision, an as yet dormant promise 
of greater inclusiveness and legitimacy in the evolving cross-border relations of humankind. 
 
 
5 CONNECTING GLOBAL LAW, JUSTICE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLE OF 
GLOBAL LAW SCHOLARS 
Having discussed the challenge and promise of global environmental law, this section shifts the 
focus towards the role of global legal experts, as well as the collective practice and professional 
culture surrounding global environmental law. It calls for global environmental law scholars to be 
conscious and aware of the legitimacy implications of their project, and therefore encourages them 
to create and nurture intellectual environments whereby deeper reflection of their personal and 
collective roles and patterns of influence becomes part of global environmental law scholarship. To 
be sure, such self-reflexivity and heightened awareness of the scholar’s role, influence and potential 
blind spots177 can only be supplementary to addressing legitimacy gaps in international and global 
(environmental law) through the more traditional focus on promoting processes and practices 
geared towards greater inclusiveness and legitimacy. For trying to imagine – even in good faith – 
personal blind spots and biases, and the potentially unwanted consequences of one’s professional 
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engagement, seems destined to be less effective than actually engaging and earnestly listening to 
those whose voices and views tend to be marginalized in the practice of global environmental law. 
 
At the same time, the need for awareness of the considerable but largely hidden – even unconscious 
– power and influence that lawyers exercise in their expert roles has been highlighted in 
international legal scholarship in ways that should not be ignored.178 In his exploration of ‘rule by 
expertise’, Kennedy laments ‘the lost opportunity to engage expertise as a doorway to responsible 
decision rather than as a substitute for ethical reflection and political choice’.179 He also argues that: 
 
International lawyers can hardly avoid coming face-to-face with the diversity and 
analytical porousness of their expertise. Such an experience of legal pluralism might 
open the way of exploring law’s role in distributive conflict and the responsibility of 
legal experts for the outcomes of struggle.180 
 
This has resulted in calls for methodological honesty and an explicit, conscious and proactive 
engagement with national, ideological and structural biases among international lawyers. 181 
Elsewhere in the social sciences, calls have been made for ‘new forms of radical reflexivity’ that in- 
clude ‘the explicit articulation of values, assumptions and normative orientations; and renewed 
attention to asymmetries in power amongst participants engaging in new approaches, 
methodologies, and processes of co-production’.182  Temper and co-authors have thus explored 
scholarly archetypes in order ‘to prompt an ongoing conversation, inviting us to consider how we 
see our scientific practice, our engagement with other agents within the process of research, how 
values are reflected in the work we do, and how we sense that research leads to social and political 
change and transformation’.183  
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Confining ourselves here to the legal sphere and global environmental law, we will draw inspiration 
from Walker and sketch a typology of global (environmental) lawyers to explore their strengths, 
weaknesses and blind spots.184 Our argument is that self-identifying with one or more such roles 
and attitudes may help us to analyze and understand how global environmental law phenomena are 
influenced by scholars both individually and collectively as they operate in different roles of legal 
expertise, contributing to the making, interpretation, application, enforcement and diffusion of 
global environmental law. All too often, environmental law scholars do not explicitly interrogate in 
their own scholarly work their contributions to international lawmaking as advisors to governments, 
legal officers within international organizations, international negotiators, litigators, adjudicators, or 
consultants in legal advisory projects;185 nor do they always ask whether the various forms of norm 
diffusion they are involved in are inclusive or exclusive of marginalized voices. In other words, one 
of the missed opportunities for environmental lawyers in not engaging more closely with the global 
law debate is the ability to contribute to a self-reflexive conversation with other epistemic 
communities, such as global justice scholars and environmental justice scholars,186 as a way to 
enrich traditional approaches to legal analysis and existing legal theories.  
 
As Hey has argued in her reflection on global environmental law,  
 
Unless more equal participation of developing states, and where relevant nonstate actors from 
developing states, is attained at the global level of decision-making, there will be fundamental 
disagreement about the aims of global environmental law, which will not be regarded as a 
system of law that meets standards of justice, or serves to protect the environment. 
 
According to Walker, who has aptly described three typologies of legal scholars’ inclination 
towards justice, global law scholars more generally have not sufficiently engaged with global 
justice scholarship. He speaks of pragmatist legal scholars who are focused on the technicalities of 
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the law and are blind, detached or impatient with ‘wider questions regarding the causes, 
manifestations and consequences of global justice and injustice’.187 This approach could be helpful 
to discover, through interpretation of the minute details of the law and considerations of mutual 
supportiveness, implicit choices and opportunities related to justice.188 But pragmatist lawyers risk 
becoming hostage to a ‘narrowly entrenched legalism’189 and never putting their skills to the service 
of a justice-driven legal analysis. A second type of lawyers are idealists, who believe that law is or 
can be a ‘deep and (relatively) autonomous steering mechanism for other global social and 
economic forces’ and focus their work on imagining new legal approaches or re-interpreting 
existing legal rules in ways that are geared towards addressing power imbalances and sources of 
injustice. But these lawyers, in turn, run the risk of being caught in ‘naïve or hubristic 
utopianism,’190 and of therefore being unable to put forward arguments that can be considered as 
technically solid as those of the pragmatic law scholars, or defensible from the viewpoint of critical 
legal scholars. The third type of lawyer he identifies are radical critics who see law as an 
‘instrument for larger social and economic forces tending towards global injustice’191 and provide 
an incredibly helpful critique of the ways in which law comes to be constructed as a result, and to 
the service, of more powerful actors and interests, which is often overlooked by pragmatist and 
idealist legal scholars. But this third group of lawyers has its own blind spot, namely the tendency 
to abandon themselves to, or content themselves with, structural fatalism.192 In addition, Mattei has 
highlighted that critical legal scholars can themselves often be ‘powerful academic superstars from 
elite institutions that reproduce academic hierarchies’ and who risk dissociating themselves from 
underlying political concerns and overlook ‘the tensions and nuances in mainstream scholars’ 
work.’193 According to Mattei, therefore, this may result in a highly theoretically sophisticated 
caricature that is carried out for its own sake, is ‘dangerously self-indulgent’, and tends to ignore 
the work of non-affiliated scholars even when it may be fully aligned with a counter-hegemonic 
agenda.194 
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Self-identifying as a representative of one or more of these attitudes and establishing a collaborative 
conversation with colleagues who espouse different attitudes can serve to nurture a culture of 
explicit and accountable discussion of scholars’ biases and blind spots. Such biases and blind spots 
derive from professional experience, institutional culture and status, and the participation in 
epistemic networks that are increasingly recognized to be key determinants of international 
environmental law as a transnational and global legal field,195 rather than an inherently universal 
and cosmopolitan one. 196  This exercise can help legal scholars become more open to 
acknowledging and engaging with power asymmetries deriving from legal education, professional 
experiences and epistemic networks that lead to ‘different patterns of diffusion and knowledge’ due 
to, inter alia, the multiple roles that international (environmental) lawyers play (advocates before 
international or national courts, advisors to governments or NGOs at the national or international 
level, and so on) and their multiple spheres of influence.197 This would also serve to acknowledge 
and make an object of study the ‘distinct insights’ of different legal scholars that are engaged in 
alternative forms of practices – and competition among themselves – to influence international 
lawmaking and interpretation on the basis of their legal diversity.198 This argument, emerging from 
Roberts’ research into the national characteristics of international lawyers, is echoed in Walker’s 
argument about global lawyers as ‘symbolic entrepreneurs of the legal world’ that through ‘globally 
resonant legal doctrine and practices’ are involved in ‘persuasive adaptation’ and therefore 
contribute to the progressive development of global law.199 It also resonates with the note of caution 
that global environmental lawyers may also be inadvertent or strategic norm entrepreneurs, and 
need to reflect carefully on the research ethics dimensions of their work.200  
 
This distinction provides a helpful basis not only for individual global environmental law scholars 
to be more open and accountable in their own work, but also for developing an argument that a 
collaborative approach and open dialogue among differently minded and trained scholars are 
together better able to analyze the current (and speculatively explore the future) capacity of global 
environmental law to cater to global environmental justice. Such a collaborative approach can also 
prove necessary for discussing normativity and legitimacy of global environmental law phenomena. 
Each of the three global lawyers is limited in their contributions, but working together they can help 
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each other identify, understand and overcome their respective blind spots and develop a more solid 
line of investigation on global (environmental) law and global justice that draws on the strengths of 
each of the individual approaches.201 Critical legal scholars can support other lawyers with their 
‘systematic attempt to include both the dimension of power and a theory of domination, and the 
relentless questioning of the “dark sides” of apparently emancipatory and progressive agendas’ in 
law, as well as ‘empowering alternative voices’.202 In turn, pragmatic lawyers can support critical 
lawyers in fully taking into account the actual nuances in the law, and can support idealist lawyers 
in anchoring their arguments in existing details of the law or actual workings of it. For their part, 
idealist lawyers can support both critical and pragmatic legal scholars to move beyond a negative 
critique or technicist analysis towards the development of a constructive proposition that can 
systematically and self-reflexively consider the dark sides of law and accurately assess 
opportunities and constraints in its detailed workings. 
 
For one of the authors of this article, the collaborative approach proposed above, informed by 
Walker’s theoretical distinction, recent reflections on international law as a profession, 203  and 
Roberts’ empirical research, may provide a way to respond to, for instance, Klabbers’ critique of 
‘international law as the law of international lawyers’ as opposed to the law practiced by states.204 A 
collaborative self-reflexive approach could manage the risk of glossing over the reality and 
theoretical implications of global (environmental) lawyers playing several roles in the context of 
state practice, while addressing Klabbers’ concerns about international legal research as highly 
competitive.205 For that author, a collaborative self-reflexive process among global environmental 
lawyers may also provide a way to respond to the criticism of soft law and other deformalization 
processes206 as undermining the internal logic and distinctiveness of the legal discipline, and instead 
harness their capacity to contribute a fresh reflection on the distinctive role of global environmental 
law in the context of global and environmental justice scholarship.207 The other two authors remain 
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less convinced of whether global environmental law as a collaborative self-reflexive approach can 
fully address concerns about normativity and legitimacy, and see the locus of such efforts in a 
process of more inclusive deliberation as well as participatory rights and guarantees. This raises the 
question of whether global environmental law research projects may also need to factor in inclusive 
deliberation (as part of transdisciplinarity), as well as participatory rights and guarantees.208 A 
continued dialogue among the three authors may help to further explore these questions moving 
forward. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
With this article, we have sought to offer a survey of global law scholarship, and showed how it 
currently remains a heterogeneous, yet substantively ambitious project to reconcile legal 
scholarship with the myriad kaleidoscopic phenomena referred to under the label of globalization. 
Despite conceptual ambiguities, global law is marked by certain common narratives, such as the 
preoccupation with public authority beyond the state and a shared sense that the forces of 
globalization are so profound they are bringing about a fundamental shift in the very idea of law. 
What that shift will ultimately render, however, remains unclear for now; the global law project, in 
other words, is an unfinished one, its vision yet to be determined. 
 
Our analysis then proceeded to review the literature on global environmental law, situating it within 
the broader context of global law scholarship. Here, too, we affirm a lack of terminological 
consistency and a concern with the limitations of traditional categories of lawmaking and 
application, in this case in the area of environmental protection. Like the global law project, it 
remains unfinished; yet we go further and identify an unfulfilled potential: to engage more fully 
with the foundational questions raised by global law scholars from a theoretical perspective, and 
also to explore and deploy advances in environmental law methodology, for instance by drawing on 
comparative approaches to environmental law and harnessing empirical research methods.  
 
Our analysis also confirms that global law remains, to some extent, a descriptive endeavour, 
focused on recording observed trends in global governance and offering causal explanations. Much 
of Walker’s elegant systematization of global law is, for instance, a mapping exercise that traces 
patterns in evolving discourses about global normative activity. But Walker’s work, as well as our 
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analysis, also shows that the diverse landscape of global law harbours various strands that amount 
to a more activist agenda, aspiring to a jurisgenerative and transformational role of global law 
scholarship. We have thus discussed both considerable risk and considerable promise in global 
environmental law scholarship: a risk of enabling or strengthening channels of authority that lack 
legitimacy and accountability, or reflect elitist and hegemonic worldviews; and a promise to expand 
the breadth and depth of voices reflected in the creation and application of environmental norms, 
strengthening rather than undermining their legitimacy.  
 
Returning from the transformational potential of global environmental law in the external world to 
its impact on environmental law scholarship and discourse, we concluded by arguing that the most 
immediate benefit it offers may be the mirror it holds up to us as a scholarly community, forcing us 
to reflect – and potentially revise – how we approach the subject matter of our profession, shining a 
new light on our biases and blind spots, and casting in greater relief how our own work shapes and 
influences the ongoing evolution of environmental law. We drew on a proposed typology of 
scholarly identities and attitudes within global (environmental) law to encourage greater dialogue 
and collaboration among differently-minded scholars to support one another in identifying, 
understanding and overcoming respective blind spots and drawing on the strengths of one another 
to develop a more solid line of investigation at the intersection of global (environmental) law and 
global justice. We also underscored the need for global environmental law scholars to engage with 
altogether different epistemic communities, something that we believe can enable a more inclusive 
and self-reflexive approach to the evolving project of global environmental law. 
 
Vibrant and at times perplexing, global environmental law stands to remain an intriguing area of 
continued research. The centrifugal forces which prompted the emergence of global law scholarship 
in the first place show no signs of abating, and hence lawyers – including environmental lawyers – 
will continue to face questions that traditional understandings of law-making and application 
struggle to answer. We can be hopeful that global environmental law, as an unfinished project, will 
both enrich our understanding of environmental law and our role therein, helping close – rather than 
expand – the legitimacy gap from which environmental governance has often suffered. But any 
project of this scope also carries some risk. It is our collective responsibility as scholars of 
environmental law to ensure that we leverage the positive potential of the global law project without 
inviting new biases or supplanting the law with our own contingent interests and values. 
